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?E WilliamA. Kaplin

A Proposed Process for Managing
the First Amendment Aspects
of Campus Hate Speech

The hate speechphenomenonpresentscomplex and
potentially agonizing problems for American colleges and universities.
The problemhas attainedhigh visibility in recent years as reportsof hate
behavior incidents on college campuses have increased. In response,
many institutions have amended their student conduct codes or promulgated new regulatorypolicies to combat actual or potential hate speech
problems. Variousnonregulatoryinitiatives, not dependenton establishment of behavioral standards and punishment of violators, have also
been implemented.1
For public institutions, attempts to regulatehate speech raise substantial legal issues under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
For private institutions, which may not be bound by the First AmendThe author thanks Thomas Scheuermann, Dennis Gregory,and Ronald Wright for
reviewingdrafts of portions of the manuscriptfor this article;BarbaraAllen for research
assistance; the Section on Law and Education, Association of American Law Schools
(Michael Olivas, Chair),and the College of Law, Universityof Wyoming(ArthurGaudio,
Dean), for sponsoring forums in which versions of this proposedprocesswere presented;
and WakeForest UniversitySchool of Law, for researchand secretarialsupport duringa
year there as visiting professor.
' Hate behavior incidents and institutional responseshave been widely reportedin the
popular and professional press; leading examples are discussed in various of the references included at the end of this article. Most of the examples used in this article are
based upon incidents reported in press accounts. For a listing of fifteen representative
examples of hate speech incidents and discussion of which ones might be regulatedconsistent with the First Amendment [see 12, pp. 244-45]. For specific examples of institutional regulatorypolicies on hate speech [see 16, pp. 194-201, 230-35; 23, pp. 274-77;
and 25, pp. 3-5].
WilliamA. Kaplin is professor of law at the Catholic Universityof America.
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ment, attempts to regulate hate speech raise sensitive policy questions
concerning the role of free expression on campus. Numerous articles
(many of which are listed in the referencesbelow) have undertakensubstantive analysis of these constitutional issues and policy questions. In
contrast, this articleexplores a preliminaryand overarchingconcern:the
process by which a college or university addresses the problem of hate
speech, and in particularthe process by which the institution manages
the First Amendment aspects of the problem. In other words, this article focuses on the decision-makingprocess ratherthan on the decisions
themselves; it is the journey, not the destination, that is of primary
concern.
The Characterand Harms of Hate Speech
The term"hatespeech,"as commonly understood, refersto verbaland
written words, and to symbolic acts, that convey a grossly negative assessment of particular persons or groups based on their race, gender,
ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, or disability. Hate speech thus is
highly derogatoryand degrading, and the language is typically coarse.
The purpose of the speech is more to humiliate or wound than it is to
communicate ideas or information. Epithets, slurs, insults, taunts, and
threats are common labels used to describehate speech.
Hate speech takes many forms. It is not limited to a face-to-face confrontation or shouts from a crowd. It may appear on T-shirts, on posters, on classroom blackboards, on student bulletin boards, in flyers and
leaflets, in phone calls, in letters, or in electronic mail messages on computer screens. Hate speech may be a cartoon appearingin a studentpublication, a joke told on a campus radio show, an anonymous note slipped
under a dormitory or meeting room door, or graffiti scribbled on walls
or sidewalks. Hate speech may be conveyed through destruction or defacement of postersor displays;throughsymbols such as burningcrosses,
swastikas, KKK insignia, and Confederate flags; and even through
themes for social functions, such as black-face Harlem parties, jungle
parties, or white history week parties.
Hate speech is a particularconcern because of the harm it causes to
the victim, the victimized group, the campus community, and ultimately
to society [5, pp. 135-49; 14, pp. 458-66; 18, pp. 2335-41; 23, pp.
271-77, 317-24]. On one level, when hate speech is directed at particular individuals, it causes real hurt to those individuals. The victim may
feel humiliation, shock, outrage, fear, and anxiety - both at the time
the hate speech is inflicted and for long after the incident. These may be
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psychic rather than physical injuries, and the result may be emotional
ratherthan physical scarring,but the wounds are every bit as real.
On another level, hate speech inflicts pain on the broaderclass of persons who belong to the group which the hate speech denigrates. If
blacks are targeted by a particularhate speech incident, for instance, all
blacks on campus who become aware of the incident may be hurt - not
just the person who was subjectedto the speech or those who personally
witnessed it. On yet another level, hate speech causes harm to the entire
campus community - with the heaviest burdensstill borne by the victimized groups [18, pp. 2370-73]. The feelings of vulnerability,insecurity, and alienationthat repeated incidents of hate speech engenderin the
victimized groups may underminethe conditions necessaryto constructive dialogue on campus [14, pp. 437, 456, 467-71; 19, p. 25]. Members
of the victimized groups, moreover, may be unable to take full advantage of the educational opportunitiesavailable at the university [23, pp.
275-77, 317-18]. A sense of community - both for the residentialcommunity and for the community of learners- may be lost to the campus.
All these various harms of hate speech implicate deeply held values of
equality and individual dignity. Whenever threats to these values move
higher educational institutions to prohibit hate speech and punish its
purveyors, however, free speech values become implicated as well. It is
because both sets of values are at stake - and because the resulting
value clashes raise complex issues concerningthe mission of higher education [23, pp. 318-25] - that institutions must approach the hate
speech problem with exceeding sensitivity and care.
First Amendment Aspects of Hate Speech
Hate speech employs words and symbols to convey a message. Campus hate speech regulations may serve to prohibit such messages and
punish the speakers for what they have said. Institutional attempts to
regulatehate speech thus raise constitutionalissues underthe free speech
and free press clauses in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
Formally, only public colleges and universities are bound by the First
Amendment; private institutions, not being engaged in state action, are
not so constrained[13, pp. 18-24]. In practice, however, private institutions may voluntarily commit themselves to comply with First Amendment norms. In the context of hate speech, many private institutions
have undertaken to do so and thus will be as concerned with First
Amendment principlesas are public institutions.
Four major free speech principles serve to constrain the authority of
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institutionsto regulate hate speech. The combined impact of these principles is substantial, and the constraints which arise from them are severe. As suggested below, however, these principlesdo not eliminate all
possibilities for regulatinghate speech; nor do they limit the use of nonregulatoryalternativesfor dealing with the problem.
Under the first free speech principle, regulations of the content of
speech - that is, of the speaker'smessage, and especially of the speaker's viewpoint - are highly suspect. As the U.S. Supreme Court has
frequently stated, "[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message,
its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.

. .

. There is an 'equality of

status in the field of ideas,' and government must afford all points of
view an equal opportunityto be heard"[24, pp. 95-96; see also 34, pp.
1173-74]. Under this principle, a content-based restriction on speech
will be unconstitutionalunless: (1) the restrictedspeech falls within one
of the narrow exceptions such as those for obscenity, defamation, and
fighting words [30, pp. 3-5]; or (2) the restriction"is necessaryto serve a
compelling state interest and . . . is narrowly drawn to achieve that
end" [35, p. 270].
Under the second free speech principle, the emotional content as well
as the cognitive content of speech is protected from governmentregulation. In Cohen v. California, the Supreme Court explained that
[m]uch linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: it conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but
otherwise inexpressibleemotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as
much for their emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view
that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual
speech, has little or no regard for that emotive function which, practically
speaking, may often be the more important element of the overall message. . . . [4, p. 26; see also 34, p. 1175].

Under the third free speech principle, speech may not be prohibited
merely because persons who hear or view it are offended by the message.
Only last year, the Supreme Court reaffirmedthat "if there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government
may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds
the idea itself offensive or disagreeable"[31, p. 2544; see also 11, p. 795].
The Court has also indicatedthat this principleapplies even to "virulent
ethnic and religious epithets . . . and scurrilous caricatures" [33, p.

2410], and that this principle applies specifically to higher educational
institutions:"[T]he mere disseminationof ideas - no matterhow offensive to good taste - on a state universitycampus may not be shut off in
the name alone of 'conventionsof decency' " [21, p. 670].
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Under the fourth free speech principle, government may not regulate
speech activity with provisions whose language is either overbroad or
vague and would thereby create a chilling effect on the exercise of free
speech rights. As the Supreme Court has stated, "BecauseFirst Amendment freedoms need breathingspace to survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity"[20, p. 433; see also 6, p.
864 and 34, p. 1168].
Each of these four free speech principles applies fully to colleges and
universities. The Supreme Court has asserted that "the First Amendment leaves no room for the operation of a dual standard in the academic community with respect to the content of speech" [21, p. 671].
And in Healy v. James, the Court emphasized that
the precedents of this Court leave no room for the view that . . . First
Amendment protections should apply with less force on college campuses
than in the community at large. Quite to the contrary,"The vigilant protection of Constitutionalfreedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools."[9, pp. 180-81, quoting 26, p. 487].

At the same time, however, the Supreme Court has made clear that
and that "FirstAmendacademiccommunitiesare "specialenvironments,"
ment rights . . . [must be] applied in light of the special characteristics
of the school environment. . . ." [9, p. 180; 32, p. 506; 35, p. 268 n.5].

As the Court has further explained, "[a] university differs in significant
respects from public forums such as streets or parks or even municipal
theaters. A university'smission is education, and decisions of this Court
have never denied a university'sauthority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon the use of its campus and facilities"[35, p. 268 n.5]. The intereststhat academic institutionsmay protect
and promote and the nature of threats to these interests may thus differ
from the interests which may exist for other types of institutionsand in
other contexts [3; 23, pp. 318-25]. Therefore, although First Amendment principlesdo apply with full force to the campus, their application
may be affected by the unique interests of academic communities.
The Importance of Process
To take full account of the four free speech principles above, in conjunction with the many other complexities of hate speech problems,
higher education institutionsneed a structuredprocess for decision making on these matters. The design of the process, every bit as much as the
substantiveanalysis of First Amendment law, is criticalto the success of
an institution'sendeavorsin the hate speech arena. Clearly,not any process will do. The following five criteria describe attributesthat an insti-
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tutional process should possess if it is to facilitate effective management
of the hate speech problem.
Criterion Number One: The process must foster a comprehensive
approach to, and comprehensiveperspective on, the hate speech problem on American campuses. To meet this criterion,the process must encompass both the legal and the policy aspects of the hate speech problem
and must include considerationof both equality and free speech values.
The process must also expose the relevant sociological, psychological,
and philosophical aspects of the problem, so that the expertise of these
disciplines might illuminate the underlyingcauses of hate behavior and
its effects upon individuals, groups, and institutions. The process must
also facilitate collection of informationon the extent and manifestations
of the hate speech problem on American campuses.
Criterion Number Two: The process must both encourage and rely
upon dialogue within the campus community. The full range of campus
interests and perspectives should be reflected in this dialogue. Thus all
of the various constituencies representedin the student body should be
included,as should faculty and administrativestaff. Such dialogueshould
be both a starting point for, and an end product of, the process. At the
start, the process should flush out and seek mutual respect for the differing points of view regarding the hate speech problem. At its end, the
process should have begun to foster conditions of tolerance that allow
the dialogue to continue productivelyinto the future [19, pp. 24-25].
CriterionNumber Three: Theprocess must encompass andfacilitate
consideration of nonregulatoryas well as regulatoryoptionsfor managing the hate speech problem, giving priority to the nonregulatory options. There are two quite different approaches to dealing with hate
speech on campus: the regulatory approach and the nonregulatory approach.2The former, unlike the latter,relies on the prohibitionof certain
types of speech and the imposition of involuntary sanctions on transgressors. As between the two, nonregulatory initiatives may reach or
engage a wider range of students, may have a more influentialimpact on
studentattitudesand values [17, pp. 245-46; 27, pp. 934-36 and 943-44],
and may better foster an institutionalenvironmentinhospitable to hate
behavior.Thus, nonregulatoryinitiativesmay have a broaderand longerrange impact on the hate speech problem. Nonregulatoryinitiatives may
also be more in harmony with higher education'smission to foster critical examination and dialogue in the search for truth [27, pp. 942-44].
Nonregulatoryinitiatives,moreover,do not raisesubstantialFirst Amend2Variousnonregulatory options are included in Phase IV.A of the proposed process
set out below. Various regulatory options are included in Phases IV.B and VII of the
process.
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ment issues or risk erosion of free speech values as regulatoryinitiatives
do. For these reasons, the decision-makingprocess should focus first on
nonregulatory options, moving to regulatory options only if - and to
the extent - the institution determines that nonregulatory initiatives
will not suitably alleviatethe hate speech problem.
Criterion Number Four: The process must assure that the institution's initiativesfor combating hate speech are adapted to the particular
circumstances of its particular campus. There is no all-purposesolution
for hate speech that can fit all campuses. Campuses differ from one
another in many relevantrespects - in the climate of tolerancethat prevails, in the diversity of the student body, in the perceptions and attitudes commonly shared by students, in patternsof social interaction,in
institutional structure and mission. Campuses also differ in terms of
their actual experiences with the hate speech problem. The number of
reported incidents varies substantially from campus to campus, as do
the types of incidents, their effect on the campus environment, and the
pattern of institutional responses. The process should assure that these
differences and variables are taken into account, so that the problems
are addressed in terms most meaningful to that campus and the solutions are crafted to its particularreality and experience.
CriterionNumber Five: Theprocess mustfocus on First Amendment
issues in an exceedingly methodical and concrete way calculated to shed
maximum light on legal obstacles to regulation as well as available latitude for regulatory initiatives. It would be a mistake to approach the
complex First Amendment issues of hate speech in the abstract. As the
legal philosopher,John Chipman Gray, warned over 60 years ago:
The danger in dealing with abstract conceptions, whether in the Law or in
any other departmentof human knowledge, is that of losing foothold on the
actual earth. The best guard against this is the concrete instance, the example. . . . I shall, therefore, try to test the soundness of any theories I may
advance, by applying them to sets of facts and seeing how they work in practice [7, pp. 4-5].

To achieve such concreteness,the process must providefor identification
of each particulartype of hate speech the institution desires to regulate
and determinationof whether some particularFirst Amendment theory
would support regulationof each such type of hate speech. This process
of matching the concrete example and the specific theory must be methodical because differenttypes of regulationswill requiredifferenttypes
of analysis under the First Amendment. There is no omnibus regulatory
approachthat can serve all of an institution'sregulatoryinterestsregarding hate speech, nor is there any grand First Amendment theory that
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can justify regulation of all the types of hate speech an institution might
wish to reach. In each instance, therefore, the question will be whether
some particulartype of regulationcovering some particulartype of hate
speech can be draftedand enforced without substantiallyintrudingupon
free speech values and without substantial risk that a court would later
find the regulationunconstitutional.
A Proposed Processfor Managing the Hate Speech Problem
What specific process might meet the five criteriaset out above? The
following nine-phase process provides a specific example that should fit
the needs of most institutionsseekingto addressthe hate speech problem.
The proposed process is phrased in terms of steps for "the institution"
to take. It does not furtherspecify which administratorsor bodies within
the institution will implement or oversee the process or who will make
the final decisions concerningthe options and strategicchoices that will
arise as the process proceeds. These matters should be addressed before
the process is initiated - and should be reconsideredas the process proceeds, because unforeseen options may arise that fall within the authority of administrators or bodies that have not been assigned decisionmaking roles within the process. Moreover,the institution'slegal counsel
should be involved in the process from the beginning and should be especially involved in Phases V-IX.
Phase I. Preparation
A. Researching the manifestations and effects of the hate speech
problem on American campuses.
B. Studying your institution'smissions and goals as they relateto the
hate speech problem
C. Listening to complaints and perspectivesof the campus community
D. Initiating campus dialogue on the problem and appropriateresponses.
Phase II. Canvassing and Cataloging
A. Collecting facts on specific hate behavior incidents on your campus, or illustrativeincidents from other campuses
B. Characterizingspecific incidents (for example, racist, sexist, or
homophobic incident; for example, incident perpetratedby student, by staff member, or by outsider;for example, incident involving speech or incident not involving speech).
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Phase III. Understandingthe Problem
A. Nature and extent of the hate behavior problem on your campus
B. The groups that are victimized and the types of harms inflicted
C. Underlyingcauses of the hate behaviorproblem
D. Free speech aspects of the hate behavior problem.
Phase IV. Identifying Options
A. Nonregulatoryoptions
1. Education options
a. curriculumrevisions
b. orientationprograms
c. special presentations
2. Trainingoptions
a. training for student leaders
b. training for staff (for example, hall advisers, campus security officers)
3. Diversity options (revising admissions or hiring processes to
increase campus diversity)
4. Extracurricular programming options (sponsoring activities
that bring various groups together and break down barriers;
for example, community service projects)
5. Support options (helping victims to heal and perpetratorsto
understandeffects of actions;for example, counseling services)
6. Counter-speechoptions (condemning/repudiatinghate behavior incidents: institutional officials, student leaders, and campus groups as counter-speakers)
7. Communication options (improving channels of communication between administratorsand students, and among various
student constituencies; for example, processes for reporting
hate behavior incidents, open forums for discussion of race relations issues)
8. Conflict-resolutionoptions (for example, voluntary mediation
for persons or groups affected by hate behavior incidents)
B. Regulatory options
1. Externalregulation(for example, ethnic intimidationlaws, civil
rights laws, state tort law)
2. Internal regulation (for example, student codes of conduct,
nondiscriminationpolicies).
Phase V. Selecting Options
A. Giving priorityto nonregulatoryoptions
B. Matching options to objectives
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C. Considering incremental approaches utilizing combinations of
options

D. Obtaining input and feedback.
Phase VI. Pursuing Internal Regulation: Determining What to Regulate (the "catalogand shopping list" approach)
A. Studying the catalog of hate behavior incidents (II above) in light
of the options selected (V above)
B. Creating a shopping list of types of incidents to be regulated.
Phase VII. PursuingInternalRegulation:DeterminingHow to Regulate
Consistent with the First Amendment (matching shopping list items
to free speech theories)
A. Regulating hate behavior that does not use words or symbols to
convey a message (the "nonspeech"rationale)
B. Regulating the nonspeech aspects of a course of conduct that has
both speech and nonspeech aspects (the expressiveconduct rationale)
C. Regulatingthe time, place, or mannerof hate speech (the contentneutral rationale)
D. Regulating hate speech that is obscene or defamatory or constitutes incitement or fighting words (miscellaneous rationalespermitting content-based regulationsof speech)
E. Regulating hate speech addressed to particular individuals in
whom it creates realistic fear for personal safety or security of
property(the intimidation/threat/harassmentrationale)
F. Regulatinghate speech in privateareas which infringesupon individuals'privacyinterests(the captive audience/invasion-of-privacy
rationale)
G. Regulating hate speech that implements or reinforcesa patternof
discriminatoryconduct (the nondiscriminationrationale)
H. Regulating pervasive patterns of hate speech that prevent a particular targetedgroup from obtaining full benefit of an education
(the equal educationalopportunityrationale).
Phase VIII. Internal Regulation:Other Legal Considerations
A. Avoiding overbreadthand vagueness in drafting regulations
B. Considering First Amendment issues that may arise in the imposition of particularpenalties on particularviolators.
C. Complying with state constitutionalrights of free expression
D. DifferentiatingFirst Amendment standardsfor regulatingstudent
speech from those for regulatingemployee speech.
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Phase IX. Internal Regulation: Strategic Considerations
A. Determining which general types of hate speech are to be regulated: racist?sexist? homophobic?ethnic? anti-semitic?
B. Determining which persons are to be protected: only persons
from historic victim groups (for example, blacks, women, religious minorities) or all persons (whites as well as blacks, and so
on.)
C. Determining the persons whose speech is to be regulated: students only? also faculty? also staff?
D. Determining whether student organizationsas well as individual
students will be subject to regulation
E. Determining the intention with which a speakermust have acted
before his actions will violate the regulations or be subject to an
enhanced penalty: an intent to harm the victim? an intent to discriminate by race, sex, and so on? or no intent requirement, so
that unintentionalactions will neverthelessviolate the regulations?
F. Determining the types and levels of sanctionsto be applied to violators: punitive (suspension, expulsion)? educational or remedial
(counseling, sensitivity training, community service)?
Implementation of the Proposed Process
The nine-phase process provides a logical progressionfor addressing
the hate speech problem on a particular campus. All institutions that
choose to address this problem through this process should follow at
least the first three phases. Institutions that decide to take some action
concerninghate speech should proceed at least through Phase V. Institutions that decide to pursue internal regulation should complete the rest
of the process.
The following commentary further explains each of the nine phases,
with particularemphasis on the regulatoryphases (VI-IX).
Phase L This phase responds to criteria no. 1 and no. 2 above. The
institution marshals general information and opinion relevant to the
hate speech phenomenon on American campuses generallyas well as on
its own campus. The institution also seeks to initiate and nurturecampus dialogue concerning hate speech. These steps lay the foundation for
furtherconsiderationof the problem.
Phase I. This phase responds to criterion no. 4 above. The institution particularizesthe hate speech phenomenon to its own campus and
makes its inquiryas concrete as possible. In effect, the institutioncreates
a "catalog"of specific incidents that have occurred on its campus and
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have concerned students or administrators,supplementingit with representative examples of incidents from other campuses.
Phase III. This phase further responds to criteria no. 1 and no. 4
above. Using informationand insight gained in Phases I and II, the institution develops a comprehensive understanding of the hate speech
phenomenon on its campus and in general. Obviously, the institution
must understand the phenomenon before it will be in a position to determine whether it has a problem requiringaction, or what action might
be required.
Phase IV. This phase responds to criterionno. 3 above. It is of critical importancethat the institution identify and weigh nonregulatoryoptions before focusing on regulatoryoptions. If it does focus on regulatory
options, the institution should consider not only internalregulationbut
also reliance on external regulation - that is, the enforcement of federal, state, and local law that may apply to some hate behavior[5, 15]. In
this phase, the institution should also identify existing resources(for example, courses on race relations or multiculturalism;complaint or reporting mechanisms, disciplinaryor grievance processes) that might be
utilized in devising or implementing options, and existing personnel(for
example, affirmative action officers, counseling center staff, studentjudicial affairs officers) who can assist in creating new options.
Phase V. This phase further responds to criteria nos. 2, 3, and 4
above. To proceed through this phase, the institution should, in short,
"determinethe objectives, examine the alternativemethods of obtaining
these objectives, and choose the best method for doing so" [2, p. 5]. Because it is unlikely that any one option (or method) standing alone will
achieve institutional objectives regarding hate speech, the institution
should consider combinations of nonregulatory options or nonregulatory options combined with external or internalregulatoryoptions, each
option making an incrementalcontributionto resolvingthe overallproblem. Just as it is important to obtain input in identifying options (see
Phase IV above), it is importantto obtain input in selecting options and
feedback on the tentative selections. Such input and feedback may be
considereda continuation of the campus dialogue initiated in Phase I. D
of the process and could be implemented through informal mechanisms
such as opportunities to comment on tentative proposals, as well as
more formal mechanisms such as open hearings in which witnesses testify concerning proposed options.
Phase VI. This phase further responds to criterion no. 4 above and
provides a partial response to criterionno. 5. Phase VI builds upon the
work done under Phase II. Phase II used the metaphor of the "catalog";
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this phase uses the metaphor of the "shopping list" that is drawn from
the catalog. This shopping list of types of hate speech incidents that the
institution wishes to regulate provides a concrete, realistic focus for the
institution'sconsiderationof internalregulatoryoptions in Phase VII.
Phase VII. This phase further responds to criterion no. 5 above. Institutions proceedingthrough this phase must pay particularattentionto
the four free speech principlesset out above. What is called for, in effect,
is a matching process. The institutionattempts to match each item on its
shopping list (from Phase VI) to some acceptable First Amendment rationale for regulation, keeping in mind that "regulatoryfailure sometimes means a failure to correctly match the tool to the problem at
hand"[2, p. 191]. This regimen of matching will likely result in a combination of internalregulatoryapproaches,each one gearedto a particular
segment of the hate behavior the institutionwishes to confront.
Under such an incremental approach, it is unlikely that all the items
on the institution'sshopping list could be regulated consistent with the
First Amendment. Some items could be regulated only at the price of
substantialintrusionupon free speech values and substantialrisk of later
judicial invalidation. The institution may consider such a price to be too
high and may thereforeremove the risky items from its list.
To guide the matching process, Phase VII sets forth eight approaches
to regulating"hatebehaviorsegments"consistent with the First Amendment. It is clear that the approaches in VII. A, B, C, and D could be
constitutionallyimplemented with carefully crafted regulations.3Strong
argumentscan also be made to support the approachesin VII. E and F,
but due to the relative paucity of precedentdirectly on point, their constitutionalityis not quite as clearas for approachesA-D. The approaches
in VII. G and H are the most speculative of the eight approaches, but
solid argumentsand some precedentcan be marshalledin their support.
The following discussion briefly examines each of the eight proposed
regulatoryapproaches.
A. The institutionmay regulatehate behaviorthat does not use words
or symbols to convey a message and therefore does not involve
3Thereis continuing controversy,however,over the validityand scope of the "fighting
words" rationale in VII.D [14, pp. 449-57]; [29, pp. 508-14]; [17, pp. 252-63]; [8, pp.
294-98; 16, pp. 222-25]. The defamation rationalein VII.D would also become controversial if extended to "group defamation"(that is, statements defaming racial or other
groups ratherthan individualsas such). Many commentatorsand courts have concluded
that group defamation laws would likely be unconstitutional [8, pp. 303-6; 29, pp.
517-20; 16, pp. 225-26], and the defamationrationalecontemplatedby VII.D is accordingly limited to defamation of individuals.
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protected speech. Examples of such behavior, that have occurred
in recent years on college campuses, include throwing eggs, public
urination, spreading human excrement, burning buildings, kicking, shoving, beatings, spitting, stone throwing,trashingof rooms,
and blocking of pathwaysand entryways. Such actions clearlyare
not protected by the First Amendment. All such activities can
therefore be reached under carefully drafted regulationsconcerning physical attacks, destruction or defacement of property,and
other prohibited acts such as indecent exposure or arson.
B. When hate speech is combined with nonspeech actions in the
same course of behavior, the institution may regulate the nonspeech aspects of the behaviorwithout violatingthe First Amendment. For example, a campus building may be spray-paintedwith
swastikas or hate slogans; graffiti may be painted on campus sidewalks; epithets may be carved or burned into a dorm room door.
All these behaviorsconvey messages;all thereforeinvolve speech.
The behavior also has a nonspeech aspect, however;it constitutes
a destructionof property.While an institutioncannot prohibitparticular messages, it can prohibit destructive acts. Such acts may
therefore be covered under neutral regulations governing such
nonspeech matters as destructionand defacement of property.4
C. Even though the institution usually may not regulatethe content
of speech (free speech principle no. 1), it may regulate the time,
place, or manner of speech. For instance, an institutionmay regulate noise levels in or near the libraryduring libraryhours, or near
classrooms while classes are in session, or on dormitoryquadrangles during hours when residentsare likely sleeping; or an institution may prohibit the construction of symbolic displays or structures in certainareas of the campus. Such regulationswill usually
be constitutional if they are applied alike to all speech ratherthan
selectively applied only to hate speech. Thus, for example, if an
4Underthis regulatoryapproach,it may be necessaryto distinguishbetween the validity of the regulationitself and the validity of the penalties imposed pursuantto the regulation. So long as all violators are subject to the same penalties, whether or not there
were speech aspects to their behavior, the imposition of penalties does not create additional first amendment problems. But if behaviorwith speech aspects is penalized more
harshly than non-speech behavior because of the institution'sspecial concern for hate
speech, additional problemsmay arise. Suppose, for example, that an institutionapplies
a destruction of property regulation to student A, who covers a classroom wall with
nondescript blotches of paint; and to student B, who paints a swastika on a classroom
wall. If the institution penalizes student B more harshly because he had engaged in hate
speech, the difference in treatment could be attributableto the content of B's speech.
The penalty itself then, apart from the regulation, would raise issues under free speech
principles one and three above and could be unconstitutional.
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institution prohibits shouting (or use of a bullhorn) on the dormitory quadrangle between 1:00 and 6:00 a.m., the regulation may
be used to punish a student for shouting racial epithets so long as
it would also apply to, say, a student shouting out the final scores
of night games in the American League.
D. The institution may regulate the content of speech which falls
within one of several exceptions to the free speech principle prohibiting regulationof content (no. 1 above). Approach D pools together the established exceptions that are potentially relevant to
the hate speech problem [30, pp. 3-5]. Thus, for example, if hate
speech is delivered by the speaker in such a way as to constitute
incitement, the institution may punish that speech undera regulation conforming to U.S. Supreme Court definitions of incitement
[28, pp. 188-90, 192-93]. Parallel reasoning would apply to obscene speech, defamatoryspeech, and "fightingwords."Each such
exception is narrow,however,and taken togetherthey would cover
only a very small portion of hate speech incidents that arise. The
most adaptable of these exceptions, and the one most frequently
discussed with referenceto hate speech, is the fighting words exception [17, pp. 252-63]. But because a fighting words regulation
would cover so few incidents of hate speech, its importancewould
be mostly symbolic [28, pp. 198-99].
E. The institutionprobablymay regulatehate speech that constitutes
intimidation, threats, or harassmentaddressed to particularindividuals and creating in such individuals a realistic fear for their
physical safety or the security of their property.Such a regulation
might also possibly be extended to speech creating a realisticfear
for the physical safety of the individual'sfamily, living group, or
friends. Speech activities with such effects are analogous to assaults and related actions that typically are punishableunderboth
criminal law and tort law [15]. An intimidation/threat/harassment regulation could apply not only to certain face-to-face confrontationsbut also to such mattersas notes containing threats of
physical harm and harassing phone calls to a student's dorm
room. It could also apply to a situationwhere white male students
trail a black female student across campus at night, taunting her
with sexual comments suggesting the possibility of rape; or to a
situation where white students dressed in KKK garb burst into a
black student's room at night, burn a paper cross, and make racially derogatorycomments. Such activities, even though they are
carriedout in part through speech, may be narrowlyregulatedbecause the danger of physical harm to person or property,and the
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accompanying psychic injury to the person so threatened, will
overridewhateverspeech interest may be at stake [29, pp. 571-72
(appendix, pt. 3)].5
F. The institution probably may regulate hate speech that occurs in
private areas of the campus and thereby infringes upon privacy
interests of persons who are legitimately in these private places.
The area most likely to qualify as private for purposes of such a
regulation is the college dormitory, especially its private living
areas. Library carrels and similar study areas would also likely
qualify. Under current First Amendment doctrine, such private
areas are not consideredto be "publicforums"open to public dialogue; and the persons occupying such privateplaces may be considered "captive audiences" who cannot guard their privacy by
avoiding the hate speech [29, pp. 501-4]. Thus a hate speech regulation limited to such circumstancesmay be constitutionaleven
though a similar regulation applicable to public areas of campus
would not be. If a white studentplaces a raciallyderogatoryposter
in a dorm room corridorof a black theme dorm, for example; or
if students tape a bouquet of condoms and a sign proclaiming
"Jewish slut"to the door of a female student'sdorm room, the institution should be able to reach such activity under a narrowly
drawn regulationprotectingprivacy interests.
G. The institution may be able to regulate hate speech that serves to
implement or reinforce a practice of discriminationby a campus
organization or informal campus group. If a campus fraternity
places a sign in front of its house reading "No Blacks Allowed,"
for instance, this speech may be an act of discrimination,making
it less likely that black studentswould seek to become membersof
that fraternity.When such speech is an integralelement of a pattern of discriminatoryconduct, the institution should be able to
cover the speech under a regulationprohibitingdiscriminationon
the basis of identifiable group characteristicssuch as race, sex, or
ethnicity. In effect, the goal of eradicating such discrimination
5Thisregulatoryapproachcould also raise the problemof "differentialpenalties,"discussed with respect to a prior regulatoryapproach in note 4 above. Suppose, for example, that an institutional regulationgenerallyprohibited intimidation, but the institution
penalized intimidation involving hate speech more harshly than intimidation accomplished by other means. The question would be whether this harsherpenalty was based
on the content or offensiveness of the speaker'smessage and, if so, whether the First
Amendment would countenance such a differentiation.A similar problem could arise
where an institution had a regulationthat punished intimidationaccomplished through
hate speech or behavior but had no regulationscovering other types of intimidationaccomplished through other means.
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within the campus community is a compelling interest that justifies the limited intrusioninto the discriminators'speech interests.
H. The institution may be able to regulate hate speech which is part
of a pattern of hate behavior whose effects on the targetedgroup
are so pervasive that group members are unable to benefit fully
from campus educationalopportunities.This rationaledrawsheavily upon the First Amendment view of the universityas a "special
environment." Under this rationale, pervasive patterns of hate
speech, left unchecked, would undermine equal educational opportunity for the targeted group [23, pp. 275-77, 317-18], and
the institution would then have a compelling interest in intervening to reestablish conditions of equality [17, pp. 250-51]. The
U.S. Supreme Court has held that colleges and universities need
not tolerate First Amendment activities that "substantiallyinterfere with the opportunityof other studentsto obtain an education"
[9, p. 189; 35, p. 277]. The Court has also held that eradication
of race discriminationin higher education is a compelling interest
that may override First Amendment claims [1, p. 2035; see also
35, p. 270]. The reasoning of such cases would arguablysupport
narrowequal educationalopportunityregulationsthat punish hate
speech and other hate behavior in order to protect the targeted
group from further harm. Such regulations could be invoked
against student organizations or individual students only when a
continuing pattern of hate speech has created educational harms
sufficient to substantiate the institution'scompelling interest in
reestablishingconditions of equality. Weresuch a regulationchallenged in court, the institution would have the burden of demonstratingthat there is a pervasivepatternof hate speech on campus
that has created a denial of equal educational opportunity to an
identifiable racial or other minority group.
Phase VIII. This phase further responds to criterion no. 5 above.
Even if the institution devises a regulatory initiative that falls squarely
within one or more of the approaches in Phase VII, other constitutional
problemsmay still need to be addressed.The institution'ssystem of penalties for hate speech violations may raise additional First Amendment
concernsif hate speech is penalized more harshlythan other activity violating the same institutionalregulation.6The state constitution may protect some aspects of free expression to a greater degree than does the
6This is the "differentialpenalties" problem discussed in notes 4 and 5 above. The
problemcould arise under regulatoryapproaches B, C, E, and F in Phase VII, and perhaps under G.
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federal Constitution, thus creating stricterconstraints on the institution
[13, pp. 10, 25-27; 30, p. 6]. Or, if the institution seeks to apply its regulations not only to students but also to faculty or other employees, additional First Amendment considerationsmay come into play.7And most
importantly, the federal constitutional doctrines of overbreadth and
vagueness (free speech principle no. 4, above) will subjectthe institution
to stringent standardsconcerningthe narrownessand clarity of its regulatory language.
The strictures that the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines place
upon the drafting of hate speech regulations are well illustrated by the
case of Doe v. Universityof Michigan [6]. The plaintiff, a graduatestudent, challenged the university'shate speech policy. The policy's central
provision was aimed at "any behavior, verbal or physical, that stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion,
sex, sexual orientation, creed, national origin, ancestry, age, maritalstatus, handicap, or Vietnam-era veteran status." The policy prohibited
such behavior if it "involvesan express or implied threat"to, or "has the
purpose or reasonablyforeseeableeffect of interfering"with, or "creates
an intimidating, hostile, or demeaning environment"for individualpursuits in academics, employment, or extracurricularactivities. This prohibition applied to behavior in "educationaland academic centers, such
as classroom buildings, libraries, research laboratories, and recreation
and study centers."Focusing on the wording of the policy and the way
in which the university had interpreted and applied the policy's language, the court held the policy to be unconstitutionallyoverboard on
its face because its wording swept up and sought to punish substantial
amounts of constitutionallyprotected speech. In addition, the court held
the policy to be unconstitutionallyvague on its face. This fatal flaw arose
primarilyfrom the words "stigmatize"and "victimize"and the clauses
concerning a "threat"to or an "interfering"with an individual's academic pursuits - language which was so vague that students would not
be able to discern what speech would be protected and what would be
prohibited.
7The U.S. Supreme Court has developed a special area of law governing the free
speech rights of public employees, and lower courts have frequently applied this law to
faculty and staff members of higher educationalinstitutions [13, pp. 184-86]. For cases
concerning faculty expression alleged to be demeaning or offensive, see Martin v. Parrish, 805 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1986), Omlor v. Cleveland State University,45 Ohio St.3d
187, 543 N. E.2d 1238 (1989), and Piarowski v. Illinois Community College District, 759
F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1985). The institution's regulatory actions were upheld in all three
cases. But see Levin v. Harleston, 770 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), a faculty hate
speech case in which the faculty member prevailed on free speech and due process
grounds.
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Similarly, in UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of the University
of Wisconsin System [34], the court utilized both overbreadth and
vagueness analysis to invalidate a campus hate speech regulation. The
regulation applied to "racist or discriminatorycomments, epithets, or
other expressive behavior directed at an individual"and prohibited any
such speech which "intentionally"(1) "demean(s)"the race, sex, or other
specifiedcharacteristicsof the individual,and (2) "create(s)an intimidating, hostile, or demeaning environment for education. . . ." The court

held this language to be overbroadbecause it encompassed many types
of speech that would not fall within any existing exceptions to the principle that government may not regulate the content of speech. Regarding vagueness, the court rejectedthe plaintiffs'argumentthat the phrase
"discriminatorycomments, epithets, or other expressive behavior"and
the word "demean"werevague. But the court neverthelessheld the regulation unconstitutionallyvague because another of its provisions,juxtaposed againstthe languagequoted above, createdconfusionas to whether
the prohibited speech must actually demean the individualand create a
hostile educational environment or whether the speaker must only intend those results and they need not actually occur.
Phase IX. This phase further responds to criteria no. 1 and no. 4
above. In addition to the legal considerationsthat are central to Phases
VII and VIII, there are also various strategic considerationsthat the institution must address in drafting hate behavior regulations. Phase IX
identifies the most important of these strategicconsiderations.There are
policy implicationsto each of the strategicchoices set out in this phase,
and some of these choices may also have legal implications relating to
the approaches and considerationsin Phases VII and VIII. The choice
regardinggroups to be protected (IX.B) has engendered the most controversythus far [17, pp. 241-44; 18, pp. 2357, 2361-63; 27, pp. 937-38;
29, pp. 506-7, 558-59]. But other choices are similarlydifficult [17, pp.
244-45 (choice IX.A), pp. 245-46 (choice IX.E)]. Regardingintent requirements(choice IX. E), for instance, it is difficultto distinguishwords
intendedto hurt a person from words intendedto convey information
including information about the speaker'semotional state. A speaker
may also have "mixed motives,"intendingin part to hurt but also in part
to convey information[8, p. 298]. Or the speaker'sintent may be impenetrable;it is not realisticallypossible to discern with any assurance what
the intent was. Moreover, attempts to assess a speaker'sintent may become tainted by subtle biases of those making the assessment;"thereis a
powerfultendency to attributebad motives to those with whom we fundamentally disagree"[23, p. 324 n.253]. Although civil and criminal
courts may be capable of grappling with such difficulties, they may be
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beyond the capacities of typical student or student-facultydisciplinary
boards. Courts draw upon the expertise of judges and attorneys and are
guided by the structure of formal rules of evidence, formal procedural
rules, and a body of judicial precedent. Institutionaldisciplinaryboards
generally do not have such expertise or such structureto assist them in
making the fine-graineddistinctionsthat intent requirementsmay entail.
Conclusion
As a general proposition, it is important for colleges and universities
to focus on the processes they use to make and implement policy decisions. With a problemas sensitive and complex as the hate speech problem, process questions become a critical consideration, and a carefully
structured process for decision making becomes a critical necessity. To
guide institutions in these circumstances,this article has provideda proposed process in nine phases, along with suggestionsfor its implementation. This article also providesfive criteriathat may be used to formulate
or to evaluateother processesan institutionmay wish to consider.Third,
the article identifies the four key principlesof First Amendment law that
circumscribe the institution's discretion to deal with hate speech and
suggests regulatory options that may be implemented consistent with
these four principles. Careful attention to process, along the lines suggested in this article, may increase the campus community's receptivity
to institutional decisions and initiatives concerning hate speech, may
help defuse intergroupand interpersonaltensions on campus, and may
enhance the quality and clarity of whateverpolicy and legal decisionsthe
institution makes.
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